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Algorithmic Discipline: A Critical Assessment of Self-Regulatory Framework of Child-Friendly Content in Contemporary Indonesia's Digital Media Landscape

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ABSTRACT

Digital media consumption among children in Indonesia has surged, positioning Video-on-Demand (VoD) platforms as key mediators of content access. In the absence of responsive regulatory frameworks, these platforms increasingly rely on self-regulatory regimes, particularly age classification systems and algorithmic recommendation mechanisms, to manage what minors can access. This article critically examines how three VoD platforms operating in Indonesia define, implement and justify such strategies. Drawing on qualitative interviews with representatives from three platforms, this study employs thematic analysis to map divergent governance models shaped by platform type, from algorithmically driven global entities to value-focused local suppliers. Using media governance theory, the study argues that the regulation of children's content is increasingly displaced from public oversight to proprietary, opaque and market-driven infrastructures. In this fragmented regime, normative power is unevenly allocated, with platforms disproportionately governing visibility and age classification. Child protection is thus rearticulated through proprietary computational logic rather than shared social norms, foregrounding urgent questions of accountability, sovereignty and algorithmic power. The article calls for a hybrid governance model grounded in child rights and institutional auditability.

Keywords: algorithmic discipline, child protection, media governance, self-regulation, Video-on-Demand (VoD)

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1.0 Introduction

A survey conducted by the Indonesian Child Protection Commission found that 36.5% of children in Indonesia use digital devices for non-educational purposes between one and two hours daily. An additional 34.8% engaged with gadgets for two to five hours, while 25.4% exceeded five hours of daily usage. Globally, children predominantly interact with software applications and audio and video content, with approximately 44% of younger users engaging with these media formats online. However, these figures should not be interpreted merely as neutral indicators of media consumption. Instead, they reflect deeper structural dynamics that influence children's experiences in the digital age, raising critical questions about the social, cultural, and political forces shaping their engagement with technology.

In Indonesia, media content regulation operates within a complex legal and institutional framework designed to manage and often censor media across various platforms. The Broadcasting Law (Law No. 32/2002) is the primary law in Indonesia that governs audiovisual content in general. This law grants the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission the authority to monitor and regulate broadcast content, including censorship. This legal framework is strengthened by the Government Regulation on Broadcasting (Government Regulation No. 50/2005), which sets out detailed provisions such as broadcasting behaviour guidelines and broadcast programme standards for content regulation in the broadcasting sector. In addition, the Film Law (Law No. 33/2009) was instituted to regulate, censor, and monitor the film content. This law is administered by the Film Censorship Board (Lembaga Sensor Film/LSF), which formalises standards for censorship, age classification, and content withdrawal protocols for films and advertisements.

In addition to these sector-specific regulations, several cross-cutting laws that impact content production and consumption include the Personal Data Protection Law (Law No. 27/2022), which regulates how personal information is handled, and the Child Protection Law (Law No. 35/2014), which illegalises media content that is harmful to minors. In the digital realm, the Electronic Information and Transactions Law (Law No. 11/2008, amended by Law No. 19/2016) also has provisions that restrict unlawful online content.

Within this legal landscape, Indonesian audiovisual monitoring operates under two separate oversight bodies for broadcasting and film, respectively; hence, this dual system comes with inconsistent standards and is void for video-on-demand (VoD) platforms. Internet-based platforms blur the lines between broadcasting and cinema, making traditional regulatory categories increasingly inadequate. Owing to the borderless nature of digital media, neither the Broadcasting Commission nor the Film Censorship Board is fully equipped to govern these platforms. This phenomenon is aligned with the observations of some scholars who have noted that state-based regulation alone is no longer sufficient in the digital ecosystem (Crawford & Lumby, 2013; Finck, 2017; Flew et al., 2019). Cross-border platforms now play a dominant role in shaping cultural flows that easily traverse national boundaries (Alberdi, 2023; Antoniazzi, 2025; Tana et al., 2020). Consequently, the state, formerly the primary authority in monitoring broadcasting and cinema content, has seen a reduction in its capacity to regulate the information accessed by the public.

Consequently, platforms have made self-regulation their principal means of governance. This involves age ratings, removal of sensitive content, and modification of cultural norms and social expectations that are common in each region. Self-regulation is now recognised as the primary governance mechanism that dictates the internal implementation of values such as ethics, morality and consumer rights within the platform. Platform operators now act as *de facto* regulators, setting community standards, filtering content, and determining age appropriateness through internal mechanisms. Media governance theory acknowledges this transition as a manifestation of decentralised normative power, in which regulation is not solely legal but is also integrated into codes, interface designs, and platform architectures. This fragmented governance landscape presents both hazards and prospects. The emergence of media governance theory was a response to a new reality in which the power to regulate media was no longer centralised but was instead dispersed among state actors, corporations, civil society, and even technology itself. Media governance concentrates on the processes, actors, and values that influence public communication systems rather than solely on law or regulation. This study begins with the idea that regulation cannot be reduced to a simple battle between the state and market. It is better understood as a constantly shifting space in which different actors negotiate power (Ginosar, 2013).

Bringing together insights from media governance and studies of algorithmic systems can help us understand how power is reconfigured in platform-based media environments. In this context, governance is not simply about drafting rules on paper by the state. It also takes shape through service providers via infrastructures that carry those rules, design decisions written into code, and the values embedded in everyday digital practices. Considering children's content on video-on-demand platforms, this means paying attention not only to the gaps left by state regulation but also to the algorithmic principles that determine what children can see, what remains hidden, and what is protected. From this

perspective, the question is not merely whether a platform provides a Kids Mode or parental controls. The deeper issue is how questions of responsibility, ethics, and protection are worked out between human institutions and algorithmic systems, and how these arrangements affect children as subjects with rights in the digital age.

In Indonesia, the absence of a dedicated framework for regulating streaming services has given platforms wide room for manoeuvring. Agencies such as the Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs (Komdigi; formerly known as the Ministry of Communication and Informatics/Kominfo), the Film Censorship Board (Lembaga Sensor Film/LSF), and the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia/KPI) have initiated dialogues with platforms; however, these engagements remain largely informal and carry no binding force (Srivastava & Thomson, 2009). What has emerged is not a clearly defined system of self-regulation, but rather a patchwork of platform initiatives, occasional state involvement, and uneven enforcement.

This situation becomes even more delicate when we consider the uneven levels of digital literacy across the country and the fact that legal safeguards for children online are still limited. When self-regulation is allowed to stand on its own, the burden of responsibility often falls on parents and children, while those who are the most vulnerable remain without meaningful protection. A landscape develops in which platforms hold significant influence but carry only limited obligations toward their users.

Therefore, focusing on how video-on-demand platforms in Indonesia practice self-regulation is not only a matter of policy design; it is also a way of tracing how questions of responsibility, ethics, and the rights of children are negotiated and, at times, contested in the everyday life of the digital age. How is the responsibility for child protection negotiated between human governance and algorithmic decision-making on the selected platforms in this study? This inquiry lays the groundwork for a critical look at how digital content for children is governed, especially in a media landscape increasingly shaped by algorithmic logic and platform-driven systems.

2.0 Literature Review

2.1 Child Protection Policies and Regulations

Indonesia faces a serious challenge in protecting children, as digital media becomes increasingly widespread. The country has more than 78 million children, accounting for approximately 27.8% of the total population (Badan Pusat Statistik Indonesia, 2024; Rizaty, 2023). This number is striking, not only because of its scale but also because it reflects the magnitude of responsibility in ensuring that children grow, learn, and participate safely in the digital environment. Moreover, it establishes children as the primary subjects within the expanding digital ecosystem. A study by UNICEF and Kominfo reveals how deeply the Internet has become part of children's lives in Indonesia. An overwhelming 98% of children and adolescents say they are familiar with the Internet, and nearly 80% use it actively (Agustini, 2019; Kementerian Komunikasi dan Informatika, 2024). This new reality of media use is fast, nonlinear, and guided by algorithmic recommendations, making traditional regulatory protections increasingly difficult to apply in practice.

The Indonesian government has implemented several policies to protect children from harmful media exposure. These include the Broadcasting Behaviour Guidelines (P3SPS, 2012), censorship measures issued by the Ministry of Education and Culture (2019), the Personal Data Protection Law (Law No. 27/2022), and recent revisions to the ITE Law (Law No 1/2024). However, these regulations are largely designed with traditional media in mind and do not fully address the challenges posed by digital environments, where algorithms and proprietary technologies shape what children see and how they engage.

This gap highlights the urgency to examine the role of digital platforms, especially video-on-demand services, which have quickly become one of the main gateways to media content for children. Internationally, some regions have begun to experiment with more collaborative approaches. In Europe, for instance, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive developed by the European Radio and GT Group Association (ERGA) outlines child protection through a co-regulatory framework that combines state

oversight with industry responsibility. It works through mechanisms such as watershed scheduling, content labelling, parental controls, and the creation of dedicated children's applications (ERGA, 2010). This method illustrates an endeavour to sustain equilibrium between technological advancement and societal accountability. Conversely, in Indonesia, the self-regulation model remains fragmented, unstructured, and heavily reliant on the goodwill of individual platforms.

A pertinent local initiative was the self-censorship movement launched by the Indonesian Film Censorship Board. Self-Censorship Culture is a campaign launched to promote public knowledge and the capacity to select age-appropriate films and television programmes. The objective of this initiative is to protect children and adolescents from content that is inappropriate for their age groups. Nevertheless, this movement is more moralistic than normative because it lacks a supervisory framework, impact evaluation, or binding legal instruments. The absence of this supervisory infrastructure poses the risk that self-censorship will be reduced to mere symbolic discourse, rather than a governance mechanism that can address the intricacies of digital media consumption by children.

2.2 Typology of Media Governance Approaches

Media governance theory emerged as a reaction to structural transformations in the global communication system, characterised by market liberalisation, technological digitalisation, and the fragmentation of regulatory power. In a conceptual sense, media governance encompasses the entire array of formal and informal institutions, norms, and rules that govern the production, distribution, and accessibility of media. Nevertheless, the understanding of media governance has broadened its scope from mere "state regulation" to "a field of power contestation," encompassing a variety of entities and logics because of the growing influence of non-state actors, including technology companies and digital platforms.

In classical literature, the state-centred approach dominates the media governance paradigm, in which the state serves as the primary regulator responsible for safeguarding public interests through content policies, licensing systems, and broadcasting regulations. This paradigm is predicated on the premise that the media serves critical social and political functions, necessitating democratic regulation. State regulation refers to formal, legally binding rules issued and enforced by governmental institutions through statutes, licensing, mandatory standards, and sanctions (Flew et al., 2019; Mansell, 2020). In Indonesia, the child protection rationale is institutionally anchored in established media governance architectures, for example, the Broadcasting Law (Law No. 32/2002), Film Law (Law No. 33/2009), censorship-related regulations, and mandates of bodies such as KPI and LSF. However, this study treats state regulation as necessary, but insufficient for understanding children's content on VoD. The problem is not simply "weak enforcement," but a deeper mismatch: legacy regulatory instruments presuppose (i) nationally bounded broadcasters/film distributors, (ii) relatively stable content catalogues, and (iii) visible points of control.

In contrast, VoD platforms operate through cross-border service provision, rapid catalogue churn, and algorithmic distribution. As platform governance research argues, jurisdictional reach and enforcement capacity often lag the transnational infrastructural power of platforms (Lobato, 2019; Napoli, 2019). In practical terms, even where Indonesian law articulates protective objectives, the means of implementation for children's content increasingly shift to platform-side systems, such as classification labels, age gates, parental controls, and recommender constraints, the design of which is rarely authored by the state. The rise in platform dominance has witnessed a growing influence of the self-regulation approach. Self-regulation comprises platform-devised policies and standards, such as community guidelines, internal content rules, product safety features, and moderation infrastructure, which are formally voluntary but materially enforced through platform architecture (Gillespie, 2019; Marsden, 2011). In this study, self-regulation is not treated as a "lighter" alternative to law; it is treated as the primary operational layer through which children's content is governed by VoD in Indonesia. However, from a political economy standpoint, self-regulation is also a form of risk management and legitimacy work: platforms must appear to protect children to maintain market access and political acceptability, while also preserving engagement metrics that underpin subscription retention and advertising value against the platform economy. This is why transparency and accountability remain central concerns:

internal standards can be adjusted without public deliberation, and compliance claims can function as reputational shields rather than verifiable safeguards (Gillespie, 2019).

Subsequent developments have presented the need for a co-regulation approach that attempts to reconcile state regulation with industry activities under a unified institutional framework. Co-regulation describes a hybrid model in which the state sets a binding framework, while industry actors operationalize requirements under formal oversight, reporting duties, and shared responsibility (Marsden, 2011; Rozgonyi, 2018). Co-regulation offers a participatory mechanism in which the state establishes a basic legal framework, while its implementation involves the private sector and civil society. This is apparent in several European Union regulations that prioritise multi-stakeholder engagement in safeguarding media consumers, including children. Co-regulation matters here not as an external comparison for its own sake, but because it clarifies what Indonesia's VoD governance currently lacks: institutionalised mechanisms that can audit, contest, or standardise platform-side child safety implementation. In Indonesia, co-regulation of VoD remains comparatively underdeveloped (Rowbottom et al., 2021). This creates a governance gap: the state may articulate child-protection expectations, but platforms retain broad discretion in how classification taxonomies are built, how age thresholds are applied, what "children's mode" entails, and how recommender systems interpret or prioritise safety signals. Analytically, co-regulation functions as a counterfactual benchmark that helps specify what would have to be present, such as oversight, reporting, and enforceable standards, for platform self-regulation to become publicly accountable rather than privately managed.

In the past decade, a new paradigm known as algorithmic governance or platform governance has emerged. Platform governance refers to the regulation exercised through code, interface design, data classification, and ranking systems, where control is embedded in infrastructure rather than solely in institutional rule making (Kitchin, 2017). Building on this, "algorithmic discipline" captures how platforms normalise some behaviours and constrain others by automating visibility, discoverability, and access (Gritsenko & Wood, 2022; Kitchin, 2017). In this paradigm, regulatory power is not exercised by the state or industry in a conventional manner, but rather by technical systems, including algorithms, interface design, and automated content moderation policies. Algorithms are not neutral but reflect probabilistic classification logic and commercial objectives that can consistently influence user behaviour. In this study, algorithmic governance is not a sub-point of self-regulation; it is the mechanism that makes self-regulation consequential.

A critical comparison of the three primary approaches—state regulation, co-regulation, and self/platform/algorithmic governance—demonstrates that no single model can address the intricacies of modern media governance.

These three approaches are not mutually exclusive; they describe a layered field in which the self-regulation strategies of the three selected platforms can be located and compared. The empirical focus is on the intersection of state regulation and self-regulation, while the development of co-regulation defines the boundary conditions that shape what platforms claim to do, what they actually implement, and what remains contestable.

2.3 Algorithmic Discipline

The roots of the idea of discipline can be traced to Michel Foucault's work, *Discipline and Punish* (1977). In his book, Foucault viewed discipline as a mechanism of power that shapes individual behaviour through three main elements: surveillance, normalisation, and institutional practices (Kallman & Dini, 2017). He presented the concept of the panopticon, a metaphor illustrating how individuals gradually acquire self-regulation, not by direct coercion, but by existing monitoring structures. Gilles Deleuze (1992) later built on this idea by introducing the concept of societies of control. Deleuze observed that power is no longer exercised solely through formal institutions, such as schools or prisons, but is now spread through networks and technology. Forms of control have become more subtle, flexible, and widespread.

In the modern digital era, researchers have started to focus on algorithms as potential new control mechanisms. With regard to influencing human knowledge, attention, and even identity, Tarleton

Gillespie (2014) has stressed the importance of algorithms in deciding what is deemed relevant. This analysis was further expanded by Kitchin (2017), who asserted that algorithms are not merely technical matters but also normative decisions that automatically regulate behaviour. David Beer (2017) further added that algorithms function as calculating machines that subtly normalise, rank, and classify everyday behaviour. In this way, compliance is no longer born of imposed rules but rather is formed through ongoing, almost invisible digital evaluation and selection.

Lyon (2018) later conceptualised a “culture of surveillance,” arguing that digital surveillance has become a normative, quotidian behaviour. Individuals are not only monitored but also unconsciously internalize algorithmic norms. Eubanks (2018) demonstrated how automated systems in public welfare programmes discipline vulnerable groups by reinforcing harsh and dehumanising digital bureaucracies. Noble (2018) added a critical dimension by revealing how algorithms, particularly search engines, reproduce racial and gender biases, thereby regulating marginalised populations through biased information dissemination.

Frank Pasquale (2015) previously warned of the dangers of algorithms operating as “black boxes,” emphasising the issues of transparency and accountability. This warning was further supported by Srnicek's (2017) political-economic analysis of platform capitalism, which explains how algorithms are used to commodify user attention and behaviour. Shoshana Zuboff (2019) expanded on the notion of surveillance capitalism, characterising algorithms as tools for forecasting and influencing behaviour to establish a “marketplace for the future of human behaviour.” Yeung (2018) coined the phrase algorithmic regulation, a novel governance model that integrates automated surveillance with minimal human oversight.

Brayne (2020) demonstrates how predictive policing technology disciplines marginalised communities by disproportionately directing police resources. Mateescu and Nguyen (2019) emphasised the aspect of the world of work in which algorithms regulate labour through automated evaluations and performance metrics, subjecting workers to digital productivity norms.

Sahakyan et al. (2025) further developed contemporary analysis by emphasising that algorithmic power cannot be understood solely as a technical issue, ut must be read within a broader sociopolitical framework. They emphasise the importance of viewing algorithms as governance mechanisms that shape individual autonomy, reinforce inequality, and redefine the dynamics among the state, market, and society.

In summary, the term “algorithmic discipline” clearly captures the evolutionary nature of control mechanisms that have been traced in modern institutions from discipline within physical institutions (Foucault, 1977) to distributed control mechanisms (Deleuze, 1992) to algorithms that now regulate behaviour, attention, and even social norms (Beer, 2017; Gillespie, 2014; Kitchin, 2017). In addition, the logic of capitalism also serves as the foundation for power transition from platform capitalism (Srnicek, 2017) to surveillance capitalism (Zuboff, 2019) to embed control in code, data, and recommendations. This concept is necessary for understanding how the VoD platforms examined in this study regulate themselves in Indonesia. It is assisted not only by legal restrictions but also by algorithms that gradually shape the digital experiences, thoughts, and perceptions of children.

3.0 Methods

This study employed a qualitative interview methodology grounded in a critical approach, emphasising depth, context, and nuanced understanding of breadth or statistical generalizability. A defining feature of qualitative research is its inherent flexibility and iterative nature, which allows for continuous adjustment and refinement during data collection and analysis. Unlike quantitative approaches, which prioritize large, representative samples, qualitative research prioritizes rich, detailed data that capture the complexity of lived experiences, meanings, and social processes. By conducting research in a real setting to address the primary research questions, the researcher examined the terminology, offered in-depth insights from participants, and employed this methodology to develop holistic and cohesive knowledge.

Given the exploratory focus on self-regulation practices in children's content on Indonesian VoD platforms, an in-depth interview methodology was deemed the most appropriate approach to uncover the particulars of content governance, regulatory interpretations, and organisational practices. The primary data source comprised five informants drawn purposively from three distinct platforms.

3.1 Sampling and Recruitment

Participants were selected using purposive sampling to ensure representation from senior staff responsible for content policy, legal compliance, and platform governance. Recruitment proceeded through a combination of formal corporate channels and professional networks. Initial contact with Platforms 1 and 2 occurred through official public-policy communication channels after submitting a research invitation letter outlining the study's scope and ethical approval. Platform 3 was accessed through professional networks, followed by internal clearance from its management office. A total of five informants from three major platforms agreed to participate.

Table 1

Informant Selection

Informants	Platforms	Description
Informant 1	Platform 1	Public Policy and Government Relations South Asia
Informant 2	Platform 2	Legal Manager
Informant 3	Platform 2	Content Acquisition Deputy Manager
Informant 4	Platform 3	Chief Operating Officer
Informant 5	Platform 3	Head of Commercial Legal, Government Relation, and Public Policy

As shown in Table 1, the informants were selected based on their direct involvement in content management and regulatory affairs, holding key positions as division heads or members responsible for overseeing self-regulation mechanisms. Although the sample size may appear limited from a quantitative standpoint, it aligns with established qualitative research standards, in which smaller, strategically selected samples enable intensive, detailed interrogation of complex phenomena (Guest, et al., 2006). This focused sampling strategy prioritises data quality and depth, enabling critical insights into the operational realities and normative frameworks shaping self-regulation on Indonesian VoD platforms; however, it also inherently limits the breadth and generalisability of the findings, which should be understood as context-specific and exploratory rather than representative of the entire industry. The aim was not to attain statistical generalisability but to produce analytically significant pilot knowledge that clarifies the dynamics of algorithmic governance and regulatory negotiation within a particular digital media context.

3.2 Interview Procedures

The interviews were conducted between January and March 2025, using a combination of offline and online methods. Four informants (informants 1–4) participated in face-to-face interviews conducted at their respective offices in Jakarta following prior appointments and institutional clearance. One informant (Informant 5) was interviewed online via Zoom due to geographical constraints and organisational scheduling. Interview sessions typically lasted between 45 and 90 minutes, depending on the depth of discussion and participant availability.

All interviews were conducted in Bahasa Indonesia, allowing participants to articulate platform-specific practices, regulatory interpretations, and organisational reasoning using culturally and legally precise terminology. With informed consent, all interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim in Bahasa Indonesia. The researcher subsequently translated the transcripts into English for coding and

thematic analysis while maintaining the conceptual and contextual integrity of key terms and expressions. All transcripts were anonymised using the platform and informant codes prior to analysis. Thematic analysis followed Clarke and Braun's (2021) six-phase framework.

3.3 Data Analysis

This study employs reflective thematic analysis to examine the impact of self-regulation strategies on video-on-demand (VoD) platforms concerning narratives related to algorithmic control, ethical responsibility, and child protection. The analysis was conducted on a corpus of textual materials related to key themes to platform self-regulation, with both authors directly involved in the analytical process. The first author initially coded a subset of the material and then engaged in iterative, collaborative discussions with the second author to compare interpretations, collapse overlapping codes, and refine the thematic structure. In line with reflexive thematic analysis, we did not calculate formal inter-coder reliability; instead, we treated these dialogues as an opportunity to deepen analytic coherence, interrogate our assumptions, and ensure a strong fit between data extracts and the developing themes. Inspired by Braun and Clarke's six-step process (2021), we treated coding and theme development as an ongoing, interpretative practice rather than a mechanical procedure.

As researchers trained in critical media study, we recognize that our own positionality shapes how we read these texts and construct themes. We approach the material from a critical and normative orientation that foregrounds power asymmetries in platform governance and the protection of children's rights. Codes and themes were developed through a combination of deductive and inductive strategies. Deductively, we drew on prior scholarship on platform governance, algorithmic accountability, and children's rights to inform an initial sensitising framework for "algorithmic control," "ethical accountability," and "child protection." Inductively, we generated additional codes from close, line-by-line engagement with the data, allowing unanticipated patterns and locally specific articulations of responsibility to emerge. By applying reflective thematic analysis, this research can capture both explicit stakeholder positions and the underlying assumptions that shape the governance practices of the three selected VoD platforms in Indonesia. Moreover, this approach facilitates an in-depth exploration to illuminate how boundaries between technology, policy, and ethics are negotiated in the contested terrain of child protection on Indonesian VoD platforms.

4.0 Results

The findings of this investigation are structured around three interconnected primary themes. Each theme enhances the understanding of self-regulatory procedures on the three VoD platforms studied in Indonesia. The first theme discusses the various governance models employed by different platforms. This illustrates the various methods employed in executing regulatory responsibilities, highlighting the significant disparities in content oversight and stakeholder engagement. The second theme was to ensure the safety of the children. This analysis not only examines the steps taken to protect children's content but also assesses their effectiveness and identifies any remaining issues. These results indicate that protection efforts are not always successful. Certain solutions significantly enhance child safety, but others merely function as superficial conformity, failing to tackle fundamental problems. The third theme highlights the intersection of algorithmic discipline and human curation. The two occasionally enhance one another, although at other times they conflict, creating tensions in perception, moulding the viewing experience, and enforcing laws. When these three themes are combined, a complete picture emerges of how the VoD ecosystem in Indonesia attempts to regulate children's access to digital media. The findings illustrate not only the existence of laws in theory, but also the interplay, discord, or cooperation among regulations, algorithms, and human decisions in practical applications.

4.1 Typology of Platform Governance Models

The typology investigation showed that child protection platforms in Indonesia are executed in many ways. All three platforms use self-regulation; however, they do so in different ways based on the type of content they have, how they distribute it, and where they stand in the global-local market.

Table 2

Typology of Platform Governance Models

Platform Code	Content Type	Self-Regulation Model	Governance Orientation
Platform 1	UGC	AI-Based Filtering & Reporting	Technocratic/global model
Platform 2	PGC (regional)	Manual Filtering & Paywall	Market-driven/regional
Platform 3	PGC (local)	Kids Mode, Curated Access	Value-driven/national

The typology presented in Table 2 illustrates an important move in platform studies, mapping how platforms govern content and user behaviour through both technical and political-economic mechanisms. By categorising platforms along four dimensions—content type, self-regulation model, and governance orientation—the table emphasises that governance is heterogeneous, context-dependent, and embedded in broader sociopolitical structures. Platform 1 embraces a technocratic-global governance model that places technology at the helm. The regulation of children's content on this platform relies more on the parent company's internal policies and algorithmic systems than on direct curation. As Informant 1 noted, *“We are a global platform... content from one country can immediately be watched everywhere,”* illustrating how the platform's scale shapes its governance approach. A combination of automated classification, community reporting, and machine learning algorithms is used to manage user-generated content. Informant 1 further emphasised this reliance on automation, stating, *“We do not use manual curation like TV or OTT; the system that operates is the algorithm and machine learning.”* This paradigm prioritises technology as the primary moderation tool and engages users as active participants; however, the platform has faced criticism for its vulnerability to accountability issues and insensitivity to local values and situations.

Conversely, Platform 2 employs a market-oriented/regional governing framework. The content is sourced from professional and licenced providers, manually curated, and adheres to age classification standards established at the Southeast Asian regional level. This dependence on regional policy direction was expressed by Informant 3, who stated, *“Regional provides the list of content and each country just selects from what is offered.”* Within this business logic, children's content is not a strategic focus. As Informant 2 explained, *“Children's content keeps decreasing because it is not our target market; we do not produce it,”* underscoring that the platform's priorities are shaped by commercial demand rather than normative commitments to child welfare. The platform manages sensitivity primarily through access segmentation rather than dedicated child-protection systems. As Informant 2 explained, *“If the content from Thailand is sensitive, we still show it but it must be under payment... only subscribers can access it, so not everyone can see it.”* This illustrates how paywall-based segmentation operates as an implicit form of content governance rather than a formal protective mechanism. Within this business-driven logic, children's content is not a strategic focus, and child protection becomes a passive by-product of commercial decision-making rather than an intentional design priority. This paradigm functions inside a business framework, wherein children's content is not a strategic segment. Therefore, child protection is more a passive consequence of their business system (e.g., behind a paywall) than a normative commitment. When there is no commercial or policy pressure, children's issues tend to be marginalised.

Platform 3, however, implements a national governance/value-driven strategy. The platform is a provider of local and original content that actively develops features such as Kids Mode, conducts internal curation, and collaborates directly with government institutions, such as the Film Censorship Institute, the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission, and the Ministry of Communication and Informatics (Kominfo). This orientation is reflected in the company's cultural mandate. As Informant 4 explained, *“as a local OTT built by local people, our mission is to ensure that local cultural values are preserved from the start.”* Platform 3 also positions itself as a governance partner for the state; as the same informant noted, *“when the government needs to discuss regulation, we have become the point of*

contact”. This shows an effort to align platform governance with social values and national legal norms. In other words, Platform 3 recognises children not simply as users, but as digital citizens requiring protection through system design and institutional principles.

These three models demonstrate a range of governance, including technocratic automation, regional commercialisation, and local value-based curation. Each has distinct implications for the identification of those accountable for safeguarding children, the articulation of responsibility, and the methods by which it is executed. Therefore, the efficacy of self-regulation cannot be determined solely by analysing the presence or absence of features; it must be considered in the context of power structures, institutionalised norms, and the types of relationships established between the platform, state, and users.

4.2 Types of Minor Protection with Limitations

The analysis of self-regulation practices on the three platforms (Platforms 1, 2, and 3), as shown in Table 3, reveals that the approaches to the design of child protection systems (minor protection) are significantly different, while also emphasising the structural and ideological constraints that underlie them.

Table 3

Types of Minor Protection with Limitations

Platform Code	Types of Minor Protection	Barriers or Limitations
Platform 1	Kids App, Supervised Experience, Family Link, Community Guidelines filtering	High reliance on parental engagement and algorithmic filtering; possible bypass via main app
Platform 2	Behind paywall, age-restriction policy in registration, manual classification	Lack of child-specific infrastructure; passive restriction; global classification mismatch
Platform 3	Kids Mode (no search), curated local content, warning pop-ups, age-based content locking	No PIN or parental lock system on mobile; assumes ideal co-viewing scenario; limited AI usage

Accordingly, Platform 1 is a unique entity that employs a multi-layered protection system powered by an advanced AI-based infrastructure. It creates distinct applications, including Kids Apps and the Supervised Experience feature integrated with Google's Family Link. Community Guidelines serve as an algorithmic form of moral discipline in Platform 1. Nevertheless, the efficacy of this safeguard is contingent upon the active involvement of parents. As explained by Informant 1, *“We can't check everyone who enters... that's actually not the platform's responsibility... there still has to be control from parents.”* The primary vulnerability lies in the fact that many children continue to access the primary application of platform 1, which is not entirely secure. Informant 1 further noted that despite the formal age gate, *“People will also fake their age... the important thing is to be able to watch,”* illustrating how algorithmic and account-based controls can be circumvented in practice. Additionally, the personalisation algorithm has the potential to leak, exposing explicit or hazardous content through system gaps. Consequently, Platform 1's effectiveness is significantly influenced by the family's digital literacy and the technical capabilities of domestic supervision, despite its technological sophistication.

Conversely, Platform 2 does not establish child protection as a distinct infrastructure. Their strategy is passive and is predicated on access restrictions implemented through a paywall system and age classification during account registration. This often leads to misalignment between regional standards and Indonesian norms. Informant 3 acknowledged this directly, *“There is a gap between global OTT and age regulations in Indonesia... regional says 13+, so we follow.”* Informant 3 also explained that the platform does not provide a dedicated children's environment, *“We don't have Viu Kids because children are not our main target.”* Instead of offering protective features, Viu filters content at the point of purchase and restricts certain materials from entering the Indonesian catalogue. Informant 2

described, *"If the content is too vulgar, we do not take it."* In addition, some sensitive types of content are no longer acquired. Informant 2 also noted, *"Even animation we no longer buy."* As a result, potentially sensitive content is diverted into premium sections instead of being structurally filtered: *"If this is content that cannot be touched by children, we put it behind a paywall."* These practices indicate that child protection is a by-product of editorial and market decisions rather than an intentional, child-focused infrastructure.

In contrast, Platform 3 is rooted in the local context and demonstrates the most value-driven approach. They created Kids Mode with a closed curation principle that does not allow for search access. Informant 4 explained the platform's philosophy clearly, *"Our mission is to maintain local cultural values from day one."* This orientation influences content availability, including the deliberate exclusion of entire genres deemed unsuitable for younger viewers. As Informant 4 noted, *"Horror is a genre we never include on our platform,"* reflecting an explicit moral boundary within the platform's catalogue. In addition, Platform 3 created Kids Mode with a closed curation principle that does not allow for search access. Informant 3 emphasised this rationale: *"Children shouldn't have the authority to search... that's why Kids Mode is search-free; we've curated everything."* They also collaborated with Mentari TV as domestic partners to provide local content and provide warning notifications prior to displaying mature content. However, this model has limitations. Informant 3 acknowledged that the system lacks parental locking on mobile devices, *"There is no PIN locking on mobile yet,"* and relies on idealised assumptions of co-viewing, which often do not reflect the realities of urban, digitally independent children.

This narrative demonstrates that the three platforms have varying perspectives on who should be accountable for child protection in the digital age. Platform 1 transfers most of the responsibility to machines and parents, while Platform 2 passively restricts content. Platform 3 assumes the role of a moral curator; however, it is not yet supported by a robust AI system. This suggests that self-regulation is not impartial; rather, it reflects the ethical priorities, technological architecture, and power relations of each platform in Indonesia's digital ecosystem.

4.3 Algorithmic Discipline vs Human Curation

Table 4 highlights the interaction between people and machine learning in regulating material, particularly for minors. It shows the conflict between delegating duties to algorithms and manual curation grounded in principles and ethics. This narrative provides the foundation for a more critical understanding of the politics of technology in the context of child protection.

Table 4

Algorithmic Discipline vs Human Curation

Platform Code	Algorithmic Discipline	Curation by Human	AI Involvement
Platform 1	High (personalisation & moderation algorithms)	Low (user-flagged)	Very high
Platform 2	Medium (paywall & manual classification)	Medium	Minimal
Platform 3	High (kids' mode & local content curation)	High	Limited

Table 4 compares three different platforms based on their varying approaches to algorithmic discipline, human curation, and the extent of artificial intelligence involvement in managing their content. Content on Platform 1 is policed through a synthesis of algorithmic recommendations, automated tagging, machine-learning classification, and user-interaction-based filtering. Within a child protection framework, this means that Platform 1's decisions about what is considered appropriate or risky are driven more by statistical parameters than by social or ethical considerations. This dynamic was acknowledged directly by one informant, who explained that Platform 1 *"...can't reveal detailed*

recommendation logic because it's part of a global system... machine learning does the detecting, not humans, so it could be compromised" (Informant 1). In addition, Platform 1 is developing age-assurance mechanisms to determine whether a user should be treated as a child or an adult. As Informant 5 explained, the most basic layer is age declaration, where users "just state their age" without validation, followed by age classification, in which *"the algorithm automatically adjusts recommendations, especially for teenagers."* A stronger layer is AI-based age estimation, which *"detects various signals, user behaviour, what they watch... the algorithm evaluates it, not humans"* (Informant 1). By contrast, age verification through official identification is rarely applied because, according to Informant 1, it is *"not feasible... the technology is heavy and not suitable for all countries."*

In contrast, Platform 3 places more emphasis on manual curation based on local values. This platform operates almost entirely through human judgment rather than computational filtering. Informant 4 described the platform's production and acquisition process as editorially intensive, and *"the team curates the content every day to make sure it fits our audience"*. Instead of relying on machine-learning systems, decisions about suitability are shaped by continuous human review and local programming sensibilities. As Informant 5 further highlighted, *Our curation is manual, from programming to checking the storyline,*" underscoring the platform's reliance on human evaluation rather than automated moderation. However, this manual model faces constraints when scaled across large catalogues, as Platform 3 does not deploy recommendation-level filtering for risk detection. Informant 5 acknowledged, *"We do not have AI that filters content the way global platforms do,"* revealing structural limitations in combining human oversight with technological support.

Platform 2 occupies a position between these two conditions. It combines age-based filtering and a payment system as a form of passive discipline. While manual curation is still conducted by regional teams, limited artificial intelligence support slows down the response to user behaviour dynamics. Content selection is determined by editorial reviews rather than algorithmic assessments. As Informant 2 explained, *"Regional chooses the titles first and then we check again whether the content fits Indonesia or not."* Algorithmic tools play only a secondary role because category changes require lengthy coordination. This was emphasised by Informant 3, who stated, *"If the regional office has already set the category, it is difficult for us to change it quickly because the internal process is long."* Consequently, human judgment, licensing workflows, and regional policy inheritance shape visibility more than computational systems. In this model, child safety becomes an indirect consequence of these manual operations rather than a function of automated governance.

These three models collectively reveal the variances in the dynamics between humans and machines during the execution of child protection. While algorithms expedite and optimise the curation process, they also transfer moral accountability from humans to machines. Meanwhile, manual curation on platforms can generate social legitimacy by adhering to local values, but it necessitates institutional and technological support to prevent it from becoming a mere token of ethics. Therefore, it is important to create a regulatory system that is not only advanced in terms of technology but also fair and ethical for users. In other words, the most efficient way forward is to create a hybrid model that combines machine learning with human accountability, which is open to everyone.

5.0 Discussion

When the VoD platforms studied in this study implement self-regulation, the issues that arise are not merely technical. There is tension between structure (who has power and regulates) and norms (what values should underlie the rules). Although they frequently seem interconnected, structure prioritises hierarchy and control, whereas norms prompt us to contemplate interests that require safeguarding. In the digital world, this issue is even more acute. Global platforms hold primary control, while the values they implement may not be aligned with Indonesia's social and cultural context. Consequently, the voices of local communities, particularly minors, the most vulnerable group, may be disregarded by self-regulation.

This shows that digital governance is more than just legislation or control. It is a matter of courage to assert values, whether regulations are designed solely for market efficiency or to protect human dignity and social justice. If not careful, self-regulation has instead opened up a new space for blurring

responsibilities, fragmenting protection, and inequality in access and control, rather than being a solution to the lack of comprehensive formal regulation.

5.1 Institutional Displacement and Regulatory Fragmentation

One of the most critical issues emerging from the implementation of self-regulation across our case studies of VoD platforms is the absence of a unified normative framework to define and enforce what constitutes appropriate content for children in Indonesia. This normative ambiguity leads to fragmented standards, inconsistent practices, and significant room for discretionary interpretation by each platform, depending on its geographic origin, content model, and institutional logic. Drawing from media governance theory, governance is no longer the exclusive domain of the state but the result of multi-actor negotiations, influenced by formal institutions (laws, regulatory bodies), informal norms (professional codes, user expectations), and technological mechanisms (algorithms, curation tools). However, as Foucault's concept of disciplinary power implies, algorithmic systems operate invisibly, governing not through law but through infrastructure, and shaping children's media exposure in ways that evade democratic scrutiny. This represents the essential principle of algorithmic discipline, shifting from the inquiry of "who formulates the rules" to "how rules are executed via machines." Figure 1 illustrates this shift in regulatory authority, showing how algorithmic infrastructures increasingly mediate the relationship between state frameworks and users while redefining the boundaries of responsibility.

The absence of a unified normative framework is not only a theoretical concern but is clearly reflected in the empirical data. Although media governance theory emphasises that governance is shaped through multi-actor negotiations across legal, institutional, and technological domains (Humphreys & Simpson, 2018; Puppis, 2010), the interviews reveal how this fragmentation materialises in platform practice. Informant 1 from Platform 1 explained, *"We follow local rules only when there is a specific request... otherwise the global system stays in place,"* highlighting how global platforms prioritise their transnational infrastructures over domestic norms. Likewise, Informant 2 from Platform 2 noted, *"If the regional office has already set the classification, we cannot change it just for Indonesia,"* illustrating how regional policy inheritance constrains national regulatory alignment. In contrast, Platform 3 displays a more grounded national orientation, with Informant 4 stating, *"When the government needs to discuss regulation, we have become their point of contact."* Together, these insights demonstrate how institutional displacement unfolds in practice, reinforcing the theoretical argument that governance in Indonesia's VoD ecosystem operates within a fragmented, multi-level regulatory environment.

Figure 1

Power Analysis and Conceptual Linkage




Figure 1 illustrates the power dynamics and relationships among state regulators, private digital platforms, and users, highlighting the limited control the state has over platforms, the platforms' extraction of data from users, and a weak alignment of normative standards between the state and public in Indonesia. Although Indonesia possesses institutional regulatory structures, such as the Broadcasting Code of Conduct (P3SPS) and the Film Censorship Board, which predominantly pertain to linear broadcasting and local cinema content. In the context of VoD, where content is streamed across borders and governed by platform-specific infrastructures, these national instruments have limited reach and legal binding. The extent to which they adhere to local legislation is readily apparent due to the disparities in operational orientation and scope. Platform 3 consistently aligns its content with national age classifications and actively engages with the Film Censorship Board and the Ministry of Communication and Digital Affairs (Komdigi). In contrast, Platform 1 implements a global system that only adheres to local regulations through specific requests, such as takedowns. Platform 2 employs a regional classification system that is not always in accordance with Indonesian regulations, thereby acknowledging the existence of a regulatory gap that it is unable to fully address. This demonstrates a hierarchy of digital compliance: local platforms are subject to a stringent regulatory framework, whereas global and regional platforms have the option to selectively conform.

This situation exemplifies the regulatory incoherence described by Baldwin, Cave, and Lodge (2012), characterised by multiple governance systems that do not yield consistent standards, enforcement mechanisms, or stakeholder responsibilities. This presents a significant obstacle in the context of asymmetric media governance, as states are confronted with cross-border actors who are not entirely under their jurisdiction. From the perspective of media governance theory, this represents a failure of institutional coordination in a multi-level governance environment, where platforms, states, and civil society actors hold divergent and occasionally conflicting expectations regarding the parameters of child protection. This disparity has sparked intense debate over the future of digital regulation: whether the government will regain control through a compliance-oriented strategy or whether risk governance and platform self-certification frameworks will emerge as the prevailing standards for children's media governance.

5.2 Technological and Social Issues in Algorithmic Governance

In the context of children's content regulation on VoD platforms, technology serves not only as a neutral instrument of efficiency but also as a central locus of governance. Far from resolving the absence of robust, formal regulation, the implementation of self-regulation by the VoD platforms examined in this study demonstrates a subtle, pervasive form of authority that governs user behaviour through automated, data-driven systems. This disciplinary mechanism operates beneath the surface, invisibly filtering and shaping user interactions by embedding structural power and normative values within algorithmic architectures. The paradigmatic shift from human-curated supervision to automated infrastructural control is arguably often concealed from public scrutiny, as evidenced by the growing dependence on algorithmic systems to filter, classify, and recommend content to children.

While normative and structural issues are often conflated in discussions of platform governance due to their shared concern with rules and power, a sharper analytic distinction reveals their co-constitutive yet distinct roles. In contemporary debates on platform governance, normative and structural issues are frequently conflated because both revolve around questions of rules and power. However, a more rigorous analytical approach distinguishes their co-constitutive yet distinct roles: structural issues concern the locus of control and authority within the platform ecosystem, namely, who holds decision-making power and operational command, while normative frameworks encompass the values, biases, and ideologies that justify and shape how that power is exercised. This distinction is crucial for understanding the contradictory practices of global digital platforms, especially in relation to censorship in the Global South.

Empirical data illustrate how algorithmic systems operate with limited transparency in the Indonesian context. Informant 1 from Platform 1 acknowledged these constraints, stating, *"We cannot disclose the full workings of the recommendation system because it is handled at the global level."* This indicates

that local teams have no access to the underlying logic that determines visibility, reinforcing the black-box character of algorithmic governance. These accounts empirically support scholarly critiques that platform infrastructures embed decision-making processes beyond the reach of national regulators and users.

The interviews also reveal how algorithmic governance interacts with unequal levels of digital literacy across Indonesian households. Informant 4 from Platform 3 noted, *“Some parents do not understand the features, so the child ends up using the adult profile,”* highlighting how protective features remain underutilised by families with limited digital knowledge. A similar concern was raised by Informant 2 from Platform 2, who explained that *“parents think the settings are automatically safe, but they do not know how to adjust them.”* These insights demonstrate that algorithmic safeguards work unevenly across social groups, disproportionately disadvantaging children whose caregivers possess lower digital competencies.

In addition to knowledge gaps, the interviews point to the centrality of automated systems in shaping children’s media experiences. As Informant 1 explained, *“The system decides what appears first because recommendations are fully automated,”* indicating that algorithmic curation plays a decisive role in determining what children are likely to encounter. This reflects broader critiques of algorithmic control but grounds them in platform operations observed in Indonesia, where computational systems, rather than human editorial judgment, govern visibility and exposure.

Platform 3 relies on manual curation and has an ideal assumption that children do not access their parents’ accounts, even though this does not accurately reflect the digital social reality of Indonesia. Platform 1 faces difficulties in detecting borderline content, which is content that technically passes moderation but is ethically problematic, as well as challenges in the volume and diversity of content. Technologies such as age estimation are being developed; however, their accuracy remains inadequate. Platform 2 encounters challenges at a structural level due to the constraints of age filter technology and mismatches between global and local content classifications. This confirms that there is a significant gap between the ideals of policy design and the reality of user practices, particularly when algorithm-based surveillance systems are confronted with complex social contexts.

This phenomenon is a prime example of custodianship of the Internet, a term introduced by Gillespie. Platforms function as active moderators of content flows rather than passive hosts, even though they do so behind proprietary curtains. A black-box society, as described by Pasquale, is exemplified by the opacity of these systems. In this society, algorithmic systems are safeguarded as trade secrets and operate without transparency, supervision, or recourse. These systems are not solely technocratic; they function as normative engines, subtly embedding values, assumptions, and biases into digital infrastructures that dictate what children observe, and, more importantly, what they are precluded from viewing.

The effects of algorithmic governance are significant. Instead of assuming responsibility for user safety, platforms relinquish it while maintaining authority over content visibility and discourse. As Foucault described disciplinary power (de Laat, 2019; Sahakyan et al., 2025), this control operates subtly, not through overt censorship, but through the tacit regulation of what can be thought, seen, and clicked on. These consequences are particularly severe for minors. Their media exposure is determined by codes, statistical probabilities, and monitoring systems rather than by ethical discourse or social approval (Cheney-Lippold, 2017; Lupton & Williamson, 2017; Schulte, 2019).

Children from families with low digital literacy are particularly disadvantaged, as they lack the skills to manage filters or understand how recommendation algorithms work. Consequently, they are more susceptible to risky content. As Eubanks (2018) and Zuboff (2019) have pointed out, algorithmic systems frequently perpetuate existing social inequalities. The most susceptible users are children from marginalised groups. They are exposed to inappropriate content and are insufficiently protected. Platforms frequently disregard the fundamental fact that digital tools are not utilised and comprehended uniformly by all individuals. By assuming that all users are capable of protecting themselves, they widen the gap between those with digital capacity and those without (Mañero, 2019).

In short, the technological governance of children's content on VoD platforms is a system of algorithmic invisibility. The content that children can view is engineered, and the content that they are unable to view is a result of calculated suppression, rather than human discretion, using automated systems that are optimised for engagement rather than ethics. This situation necessitates immediate regulatory action. Global platform corporations often deflect responsibility for ambiguous or inconsistent censorship practices by blaming third-world governments for failing to provide clear regulatory guidelines (Gillespie, 2018; Suzor, 2019). This rhetoric positions these states as incapable or unwilling regulators, thereby legitimising the platforms' own reticence to establish transparent content governance policies. Simultaneously, these platforms wield immense, unilateral power to govern speech, visibility, and access within their ecosystems through opaque algorithmic and policy mechanisms that privilege particular normative agendas (Tufekci, 2015). By embedding dominant sociopolitical values and commercial interests into their technological infrastructure, platforms essentially make certain control methods seem normal and natural. This process makes control mechanisms appear neutral and technical, while being fraught with vested interests. Consequently, local legal contexts and social diversity are often marginalized (Gorwa, 2019).

6.0 Conclusion

In conclusion, although the findings are constrained by the small exploratory sample on which this study is based, they nonetheless indicate that deficiencies in the self-regulatory methods of VoD platforms in Indonesia are not solely technological but also encompass structural and normative concerns that directly affect child protection. Within these empirical limits, two strategic measures can be suggested to ensure that children's rights are prioritised in digital governance and that public accountability is restored, while acknowledging the need for future research with larger and more diverse samples to test.

The first step is to establish a participatory and binding co-regulatory framework. This framework must engage the state, platforms, and civil society in the formulation, enforcement, and evaluation of regulations pertaining to children's material. Thus far, the lack of clear legal regulations has allowed VoD platforms operating in Indonesia to set their own child safety standards based on their business interests, rather than social values. Therefore, the existence of a law specifically governing non-linear platforms is crucial, going beyond a voluntary code of ethics or informal discussions for audiovisual platforms. The state needs to regain its role in setting norms while allowing for more diverse, inclusive, and flexible regulations. This can be done by uniting relevant institutions, such as the Film Censorship Board, the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission, and Komdigi, within a clear and interconnected legal framework.

Furthermore, firm standards for algorithmic accountability and technology design ethics are needed. Relying solely on optional parental controls or child-friendly features is no longer sufficient. Platform algorithmic systems must be independently audited and externally monitored so that the real impact of their recommendations and filters can be critically examined, not simply documented in compliance reports. Without these measures, algorithms will continue to function as "black boxes" that silently direct children's experiences in the digital world, often favouring business interests over ethical ones.

Ultimately, protecting children in the digital space is not merely a technical issue, but also a political and moral one. This protection requires institutional support, a strong legal basis, and ongoing accountability. Our call is to shift from voluntary and individual governance to a more comprehensive, robust, enforceable, and child-rights-centred system. In the algorithmic era, the obligations of governments, platforms, and society must be guided by the fundamental principles of child protection.

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Conflict of Interest

The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.

Author Contribution Statement

AH: Conceptualisation, Methods, Data Collection & Transcription, Writing – Original Draft Preparation. SSN: Supervision, Data Validation & Curation, Writing – Review & Proofread.

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